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W ARRANTLESS SEARCH OF A
COLLEGE DORMITORY
RONALD

J.

BACIGAL

*

a part of the collegiate experience as
S intellectual pursuit,is asandmuch
regulation of student conduct has been a
TUDENT CONDUCT

concern of university officials for as long as there have been students and
universities. Until the 1960s the courts had few occasions to concern
themselves with the regulation of student conduct; and, university officials
were free to take any action short of action that was arbitrary and
capricious. 1 University officials were deemed to stand in loco parentis
and thus could make and enforce any regulation for the physical training,
moral enrichment, and betterment of their pupils that a parent would
make for the same purpose. 2 This view of life in the Ivory Tower may
or may not have been an accurate appraisal of actual campus life in
the past; but, it clearly bore no relation to campus life in the 1960s. As
one federal district court judge observed:
I take notice that particularly in recent years the universities have
become theaters for stormy and often violent protests over such
matters as war and peace, racial discrimination in our cities and elsewhere, and the quality of American life; that this phenomenon adds
new and unanticipated dimensions to the regulation of conduct in the
universities; and that those charged with governance of these institutions have been struggling to preserve many competing values involved.3
To some extent this struggle to preserve many competing values was
transferred from university officials to the courts when Dixon v. Bd.
of Educ. 4 abandoned the judiciary's traditional reluctance to examine
academic due process.5 In Dixon the court stated that "[w]henever a
• B.S., Concord College; J.D., Washington and Lee University, School of Law;
Diploma, University of Amsterdam; Professor of Law, T. C. Williams School of
Law, University of Richmond.
1 The president and faculty of a university necessarily have "inherent general power
to maintain order and to exclude those who are detrimental to the student body and
the institution's well-being, so long as they exercise sound discretion and do not act
arbitrarily or capriciously." Barker v. Hardway, 283 F.Supp. 228, 235 (S.D. W.Va.
1968).
2 Stetson Univ. v. Hunt, 88 Fla. 510, 102 So. 637 (1924).
3 Soalin v. Kauffman, 295 F.Supp. 978, 988 (W.D. Wisc. 1968). Although the 1960s
may have been a watershed in student activism, there is not yet any basis for believing
that the 1970s will mark a period of tranquility. Bayer & Astin, Campus Unrest,
1970-71: Was It Really All That Quiet? 52 Enuc. REc. 301-313 (Fall 1971).
4294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1961).
5 In Zanders v. Bd. of Ed., 281 F.Supp. 747, 760 (W.D. La. 1968), the court expressed
some apparent impatience with the failure of university officials to accord students
their rights under due process of law.
If minimum standards of fairness, having been repeatedly articulated for over
50 years, are not afforded to students in disciplinary cases, then, as is becoming
the rule rather than the exception in all fields today, courts, state and federal,
(422)
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governmental body acts so as to injure an individual, the Constitution
requires that the act be consonant with due process of law." 6 The holding
of Dixon is limited to state-supported colleges 7 and is vague regarding
specific rights included under due process; 8 but, the decision did clearly
establish that disciplinary action of university officials was subject to
judicial review. 9

Dixon established only the perimeters of judicial review, recognizing
that a student has a right to procedural safeguards greater than those
present in an informal interview, but Jess than all the safeguards inherent
in a criminal proceeding. 10 The specific rights embodied between these two
perimeters are uncertain and there has been extensive discussion of exactly
what due process rights a student possesses. 11 The scope of this article is
confined to an examination of one of those rights, the fourth amendment
right to be free of unreasonable searches and seizures. There are relatively
few cases dealing with the search of a student's dormitory room 12 and the
will draft rules on an ad hoc, a case by case, basis to insure that rights of
students adequately are protected.
The federal district court for the western district of Missouri so willingly plunged
into the struggle that rather than evolve the standards on a case by case basis, it
promulgated a General Order on Judicial Standards of Procedure and Substance i11
Review of Student Discipline in Tax Supported Institutions of Higher Education, 45
F.R.D. 133 (W.D. Mo. 1968).
Dixon v. Bd. of Ed., 294 F.2d 150, 155 (5th Cir. 1961) [hereinafter cited as Dixon].
Public universities are considered to be instruments of the state, thus the action of
public university officials is state action and the students are entitled to that degree
of due process required by the fourteenth amendment. With private universities there
is a lack of state action thus the fourteenth amendment does not apply. Courts have
held that attendance at a private school is not a right but a privilege which may be
discontinued at the option of the university, and there are no constitutional limitations
on the exercise of that option. For a summary of existing law and arguments in favor
of applying the fourteenth amendment to private universities see An Overview: The
Private University and Due Process, 1970 DUKE L.J. 795 (1970).
a E.g., Procedural Due Process and Campus Disorder: A Comparison of Law and
Practice, 1970 DuKE L.J. 763 (1970); Van Alstyne, The Student as University
Resident, 45 DENVER L.J. 582 (1968); Academic Freedom, 81 HARV. L. REv. 1045
(1968); Note, 3 GA. L. REv. 426 (1969).
9 "[W]ith the exception of dictum in one district court case, there has been no
challenge by any court, state or federal, to the basic proposition for which Dixon
stands, that students at a public institution of higher learning do have constitutional
rights that the courts will recognize and protect." Wright, The Constitution on the
Campus, 22 VAND. L. REv. 1027, 1032 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Wright]. But it is
not as clear that legislatures will accept this basic proposition as readily as the courts.
E.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. § 301 (Supp. 1973) (providing for expulsion without any
provision for a hearing).
10 To require a "full dress judicial hearing" would be "impractical and detrimental to
the educational atmosphere and functions of a university." Goldberg v. Regents of the
Univ. of Calif., 248 Cal. App.2d 867, 881-82, 57 Cal. Rptr. 463, 473 (Cal. App.
1967); accord, Esteban v. Central Mo. State College, 290 F. Supp. 622 (W.D. Mo.
1968).
11 Supra note 8.
12 Before the age of the student as a militant litigator few cases reached the courts
because universities preferred to handle matters quietly within the university and thus
avoid any publicity which could damage the university's image. The university would
6

7
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holdings are frequently unclear because they mix consideration of
the existence of the right to privacy with the methods of protecting the
right. It is suggested that some of the confusion could be avoided if
the courts were to consider first whether the fourth amendment right
to privacy applies to a university dormitory room, and then determine
what procedures are applicable in relation to the right: e.g., the
requirement for a search warrant; the standards of probable cause; and
the application of the exclusionary rule.13
THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY

The first question the courts must consider is whether there are any
limitations on when and how university officials may search a dormitory
room. Since the fourth amendment has no application to searches and
seizures conducted by private individuals, 14 the courts have jurisdiction to
review only state action infringing on the constitutional right to a
reasonable expectation of privacy. In spite of indirect public financial
support and state regulation of private universities, the courts have thus
far held that the actions of private university officials are not to be
considered as a form of state action. 15 Thus this article is concerned only
with the actions of public university officials, since such action is state
action within the meaning of the fourteenth amendment.16
If the university is deemed a public university, the courts must then
consider whether the constitutional right to a reasonable expectation of
privacy 17 exists in a dormitory room, thereby affording the resident fourth
"simply exile the tainted student from the academic community. Once administrators
had accomplished their goal, the matter was usually forgotten by all concerned."
Armstrong, College Search and Seizure: Privacy and Due Process Problems on
Campus, 5 CRIM. L. BULL. 537, 552 n.85 (1969).
13 In oral argument before the Supreme Court on United States v. Calandra, 94
S. Ct. 613 (1974), argued Oct. 11, 1973, Chief Justice Burger stated "I do not recall
any case where the court has discussed [the exclusionary rule] except as a means of
keeping the system healthy.... It is spoken of as a benefit to the system of justicenot to the individual.... It is not a right of the individual." 14 CB.IM. L. RPn. 4045
(Oct. 17, 1973).
14 Although there is some academic debate as to whether the fourth amendment
applies to searches by private citizens, see e.g. United States v. McGuire, 381 F.2d
306, 313 n.5 (2nd Cir. 1967), the law is fairly well settled that private individuals
acting independent of government involvement may conduct a search which would be
unconstitutional if performed by the government. Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S.
465, 475 (1921).
15 See note 7 supra. But see Guillory v. Tulane Univ., 203 F. Supp. 855 (E.D. La.
1962). In Hammond v. Univ. of Tampa, 344 F.2d 951 (5th Cir. 1965), the court
noted that
"[a)lthough the University of Tampa is not a state or city institution in the
usual sense, its establishment was largely made possible by the use of a surplus
city building and the use of other city land leased for the University purposes .
. . . [T]he City's involvement in the establishment and maintenance was of such
a nature as to require a holding that "state" action under the Fourteenth
Amendment was involved in the denial of appellants' rights.
16 Supra note 7.
17 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
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amendment protection against unreasonable searches by university officials.
Professor Charles Wright has contended that there can be no reasonable
expectation of privacy in a dormitory room, thus the courts need never
concern themselves with searches of dormitory rooms. 1 B Such an approach
would certainly simplify matters for the courts, and in the search and
seizure area, would signal a return to pre-Dixon days. Anyone who has
ever resided in a college dormitory is aware of the practical limitations
on his privacy; but, can it be said as a matter of law that there is no
reasonable expectation of privacy? 19 The various theories advanced
against a reasonable expectation of privacy are considered below.
ABSENCE OF PROPERTY RIGHTS

The courts have avoided classifying a dormitory resident's status in
the classic terminology of property Iaw, 20 thus some commentators have
suggested that by casting their powers in property terms universities could
preserve an option to enter at will. 21 Such a theory diametrically
contravenes Justice Stewart's view that:
[T]he Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a person
knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is
not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection ... But what he seeks
to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may
be constitutionally protected. 22
The subtleties of the law of property in distinguishing a license from
an interest in property should have no significance within the context of
the fourth amendment. "Anyone legitimately on premises where a search
occurs may challenge its legality by way of a motion to suppress, when its
fruits are proposed to be used against him." 23 Although it is arguable
whether the dormitory resident and the university stand in a tenantlandlord relationship, 24 it is clear that the student possesses at least the
rights of a lodger. 25 The complete relationship between a dormitory
1s Wright, supra note 9. Cf. Moore v. Student Affairs Comm. of Troy State Univ.,
284 F. Supp. 725 (M.D. Ala. 1968) [hereinafter cited as Moore]; Commonwealth
v. McCloskey, 217 Pa. Super. 432, 272 A.2d 271 (1970).
19 ''To suggest that a student who lives ofi campus in a boarding house is protected
but that one who occupies a dormitory room waives his constitutional liberties is at
war with reason, logic and law." People v. Cohen, 292 N.Y.S.2d 706, 713 (1st Dist.
1968).
20 E.g., Moore, 284 F. Supp. 725 (M.D. Ala. 1968). Perhaps the courts seek to avoid
collateral complications that could arise from according students a status as a tenant,
licensee, or lodger.
21 E.g., Knowles, Crime Investigation in the School: Its Constitutional Dimensions, 4
J. FAMILY L. 151, 164 (1964). See also United States v. Donato, 269 F. Supp. 921,
924 (E.D. Pa. 1967); People v. Overton, 283 N.Y.S.2d 22 (1967).
22 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351-52 (1967).
23Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 267 (1960).
24 Goldman, The University and the Liberty of Its Students-A Fiduciary Theory, 54
KY. L.J. 643, 681 (1966).
25 The fourth amendment protects the right of privacy in rented houses, Chapman
v. United States, 365 U.S. 610 (1961); rooms in boarding houses, McDonald v. United
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resident and the university encompasses much more than the ordinary
lodger-proprietor relationship, but the additional relations between student
and university should be considered on their own merits, and should not
be viewed as destroying the traditional fourth amendment rights of a
lodger. Inherent in the lodger-proprietor relationship is the proprietor's
duty to respect the lodger's privacy in the premises.
CONSENT-WAIVER

Obviously there is no invasion of privacy when one freely and
voluntarily consents to an entry. Thus it has been argued that even if a
reasonable expectation of privacy could exist in regard to a dormitory
room, the right is waived when the student consents to dormitory regulations which allow university officials to enter at will for inspection
purposes. 26 The difficulty with the consent theory is in determining whether
a student's acquiescence to dormitory regulations can be classified as
consent, freely and voluntarily given. It is clear that the burden of
establishing free and voluntary consent rests upon the prosecution; 27 but
it is not as clear, within the context of student rights, what facts are
required to meet this burden. In Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 28 the
Supreme Court defined the test for voluntary consent thusly: "[T]he
question whether a consent to a search was in fact 'voluntary' or was the
product of duress or coercion, express or implied is a question of fact to
be determined from the totality of all circumstances." 29 The Court went
on to make an interesting distinction between the standard for consent to
a search (factual determination of voluntariness) vis-a-vis the standard for
waiver of certain constitutional rights ("an intentional relinquishment or
abandonment of a known right or privilege") .30 The Court held that the
States, 335 U.S. 451 (1948); and hotel rooms, Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483
(1964). In Commonwealth v. McClosky, 217 Pa. Super. 432, 272 A2d 271 (1970),
the court reasoned that a dormitory room is analogous to an apartment or hotel
room, and affords the occupant a reasonable expectation of privacy.
26 A typical regulation was that cited in Moore, 284 F. Supp. 725, 728 (M.D. Ala.
1968): "The college reserves the right to enter rooms for inspection purposes. If the
administration deems it necessary the room may be searched and the occupant
required to open his personal baggage and any other personal material which is
sealed." Even absent such an explicit provision, courts have held that every dormitory
resident impliedly consents to entry by university officials. "It is implicit in the rules
that the appellant had agreed that the master, in the performance of his duties in
upholding the high disciplinary standards and integrity of the school, might enter the
room." People v. Kelley, 195 Cal. App.2d 72, 77-78, 16 Cal. Rptr. 177, 182 (Ct.
App. 1961). The usual corollary of a student's consent to an entry by university
officials is that the university officials may then consent to entry by the police. People
v. Cohen, 292 N.Y.S.2d 706, 709 (1st Dist. 1968), rejected the corollary thusly: [E]ven
if the doctrine of implied consent were imported into this case, the consent is given,
not to police officials, but to the University and the latter cannot fragmentize, share
or delegate it."
27 Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543; 548 (1968).
28 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
29 Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U.S. 218, 227 (1973) [hereinafter cited as
Schneckloth).
so Id. at 235-38.
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stricter standard for waiver had "[a]lmost without exception ... been
applied only to those rights which the Constitution guarantees to a criminal
defendant in order to preserve a fair triaJ."31 The Court noted "that there
is no universal standard that must be applied in every situation where a
person forgoes a constitutional right," 32 and that
[t]here is a vast difference between those rights that protect a fair
criminal trial and the rights guaranteed under the Fourth Amendment. Nothing, either in the purposes behind requiring a "knowing"
and "intelligent" waiver of trial rights, or in the practical application
of such a requirement suggests that it ought to be extended to the
constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures. 33
If Schneckloth is accepted at face value, it seems clear that the university

need not inform a dormitory resident of his right to privacy before
eliciting a waiver of that right.
However, the factual situation before the Court in Schneckloth dealt
with the consent to a search, given on the scene and during an investigation. The practical limitations of obtaining consent in such a factual
situation clearly played a part in the decision, for the Court noted that:
Consent searches are part of the standard investigatory techniques of
law enforcement agencies. They normally occur on the highway, or
in a person's home or office, and under informal and unstructured
conditions. The circumstances that prompt the initial request to
search may develop quickly or be a logical extension of investigative
police questioning. The police may seek to investigate further
suspicious circumstances or to follow up leads developed in questioning persons at the scene of a crime. (Emphasis added.) 34
Obviously, none of the above characteristics of a "normal consent
search" would apply to a university requirement that all dormitory
residents consent to all future searches. The university is not acting under
"informal and unstructured conditions." The circumstances prompting a
search have not developed "quickly" nor is the request "a logical extension
of investigative police questioning." The university is not investigating
"further suspicious circumstances" and is not following up "leads
developed in questioning persons at the scene of a crime." Nothing could
be further removed from the factual situation in Schneckloth than the
structured conditions under which a student is admitted to a university
and accepted as a dormitory resident. The university is not eliciting
consent to a specific search which is a part of an investigation; rather, the
university seeks complete abandonment of the right to privacy and consent
to all future entries. Schneckloth may have been correct in observing that:
"It would be unrealistic to expect that in the informal, unstructured
at 237.
at245.
33 Jd. at 241.
34 Jd. at 231-32.
31 Jd.

32 Jd.
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context of a consent search, a policeman, upon pain of tainting the
evidence obtained, could make the detailed type of examination.... "
required to establish a knowing and intelligent waiver of a constitutional
right. 35 But, it does not seem unrealistic, within the typical setting of
student registration, to require the university to inform the student that he
is being asked to waive an important constitutional right. At registration a
student is faced with a multitude of forms and informational materials,
and it would not place an unreasonable burden upon the university to
require that the materials include a written waiver form explaining to the
student what rights he must surrender in order to qualify as a dormitory
resident. Assuming that such a wholly prospective and complete
abandonment of a constitutional right does not violate public policy,36 the
university could then forcefully argue that the written waiver constituted
an intelligent relinquishment of a known right.
If the concept of waiver is inapplicable to a university dormitory
situation, then the less strict standard for consent will be applied and the
university will be required to establish only that the consent was voluntary
and not the result of coercion.37 However, it is doubtful if the university
can meet even this lesser burden. In many universities first and second
year students are required to live in a dormitory; and, they are, therefore,
required to accept dormitory regulations which eliminate the right to
privacy. Even when residence in a university dormitory is a matter
of choice, the student has no right to negotiate on the terms of the
dormitory regulations; thus, he is coerced into giving up his fourth
amendment rights. Of course, it can always be argued that the student
does have a choice because he is free to choose not to reside in a
dormitory, or in fact may choose not to attend a university. While such
a choice may be voluntary within the literal definition of voluntariness, 38
it is not the type of voluntary choice contemplated by the Constitution.
"[T]he State cannot condition the granting of even a privilege upon
Id. at 245.
courts would have to consider the wisdom of allowing a person to enter into
an agreement whereby he surrenders his constitutional rights in future situations which
he cannot foresee at the time of the waiver. This may be a purely academic question
since it is difficult to conceive of anyone making such a general waiver of rights in
the absence of some pressure or coercion being applied. If there is coercion, even
in the form of withholding a privilege, then "the rule is that the right to continue the
exercise of a privilege granted by the state cannot be made to depend upon
the grantee's submission to a condition prescribed by the state which is hostile to the
provisions of the federal Constitution." United States v. Chicago, M. St. P. & P. R.
Co., 282 U.S. 311, 328-29 (1931).
:n Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 248.
38 In Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 224, n. 7, the court noted that the presence of disagreeable alternatives does not eliminate the possibility of choice. "As between the rack and
a confession, the latter would usually be considered the less disagreeable; but it is
nonetheless a voluntary choice." 3 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 826 (J. Chadbourn .rev.
1970). But in determining the legal standard for voluntary choice, the court noted
that "neither linguistics nor epistemology will provide a ready definition of the
meaning of 'voluntariness.'" Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 224.

35

36 The
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renunciation of the constitutional right to procedural due process."39 If it
is accepted that a dormitory resident possesses the constitutional right
to be free of unreasonable searches and seizures, then "a tax-supported
public college may not compel a 'waiver' of that right as a condition
precedent to admission." 40 Any consent obtained under such a condition
must be considered involuntary.
IN

Loco PARENTIS

As noted earlier, the actions of public university officials are to be
considered as a form of state action. 41 But the in loco parentis theory
contends that the fourth amendment is limited to a specific form of state
action, i.e., state action in fulfilling the police function of collecting
evidence to be used in a criminal prosecution. University officials are not
serving the police function but rather the parental duty of caring for a
wayward child. 42 Thus, the argument goes, the student has no need for the
protection of the fourth amendment because the possible university
sanctions against the student are much less severe than the sanctions facing
the criminal defendant, 43 and the motivation of university officials
conducting the search is totally different from the motivation of the
police. 44 The obvious rebuttal to this argument is that the university
sanction may indeed· be severe since suspension or expulsion from college
may prevent admission to other institutions thus amounting to a lifelong
stigma. 45 Should this stigma prevent a student from ever attaining a college
degree, it may cost the student up to $178,000 in potential lifetime
income. 46 As for the university officials' motivation, the initial problem is
in factually determing subjective motivation. But even if university officials
could establish that they were motivated by the noblest of considerations,
motivation should never be accepted as a justification for a violation of
constitutional rights. It is hard to resist the cliche that the road to hell is
paved with good intentions; but, one need only look to the "Watergate"
39 Dixon, 294 F.2d at 156.
Moore, 284 F. Supp. at 729.
note 7.
42 See text accompanying note 2 supra.
43 See Esteban v. Central Mo. State College, 290 F; Supp. 622, 628 (W.D. Mo. 1968),
where the court held that "the disciplinary process is not equivalent to the criminal
law processes.... For, while the expelled student may suffer damaging effects, sometimes irreparable, to his educational, social, and economic future, he or she may not
be imprisoned, fined, disenfranchised, or subjected to probationary supervision."
44Piazzola v. Watkins, 442 F.2d 284 (5th Cir. 1971); Keene v. Rodgers, 316 F. Supp.
217 (D. Me. 1970); Commonwealth v. McCloskey, 217 Pa. Super. 432, 272 A.2d 271
(1970). All of the above cases held, at least in dicta, that a university can conduct a
warrantless search for educational or proprietary purposes but not "for the primary
purpose of a criminal prosecution." Piazzola at 289 (emphasis added).
45 Sherry, Governance of the University: Rule, Rights, and Responsibilities. 54 CALIP.
L. REV. 23, 36-37 (1966).
46 Based on projected average lifetime income of males with educational backgrounds
ranging from a high school diploma to a college degree. 1962 Statistical Abstract of
the United States 119; See also 1972 Statistical Abstract of the United States 114.
40

41 Supra
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situation to observe where justification based on high motivation can
lead. Also, there is really no need to grapple with the philosophical
question of whether the end can justify the means, when it is clear that
the purpose of the fourth amendment is to protect "the common-law right
of a man to privacy in his home .... To say that a man suspected of
crime has a right to protection against a search of his home without
a warrant, but that a man not suspected of a crime has no such
protection, is a fantastic absurdity. " 47 In considering the fourth amendment right to privacy, subjective motivation is simply irrelevant. "It is the
individual's interest in privacy which the Amendment protects, and that
would not appear to fluctuate with the 'intent' of the invading officers." 48
Perhaps the most glaring weakness of the in loco parentis theory
is that focusing on subjective motivation ignores the very practical
consideration that breaches of university regulations frequently constitute
crimes (e.g., unlawful possession of drugs) and thus subject the student
to prosecution regardless of the original purpose of the search. It is
of no comfort to a student facing criminal prosecution to be told
that the university officials had not originally contemplated any criminal
prosecution. "The intent of the executioner cannot lessen the torture or
excuse the result." 49 In Mathis v. United States 50 the Supreme Court held
that when in an investigation of a civil matter, there exists the possibility
of criminal sanctions, even though not contemplated, the person should be
given Miranda warnings before interrogation. Since the mere possibility
of criminal prosecution is enough to trigger the applicability of the fifth
amendment, there appears no reason why the possibility of criminal
sanctions should not also make the fourth amendment applicable,
regardless of the subjective intent of the individuals conducting the search.
PuBLIC INTERESTS

Perhaps the most forthright argument against a reasonable expectation
of privacy in a dormitory room is the simple realization that the right to
privacy is not absolute and must at times yield to a greater public interest.
The fourth amendment prohibits only "unreasonable" searches, and
because of the public interest in a given situation, a warrantless search
may be considered reasonable. 51 Further, it has been stated that a large
District of Columbia v. Little, 178 F.2d 13, 16-17 (D.C. Cir. 1949). The Supreme
Court recognized this principle in Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 530
(1967), where the court held that "it is surely anomalous to say that the individual
and his private property are fully protected by the fourth amendment only when the
individual is suspected of criminal behavior."
48 Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 255 (1960) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
49 Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 477 (1947) (Burton, J.,
dissenting).
so 391 U.S. 1 (1968).
51 Such an approach is based on the theory that the warrant clause and the reasonableness clause of the fourth amendment are independent. Thus the constitutional
validity of a search can be judged solely on the basis of its reasonableness, regardless
47
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concentration of youth within the campus setting tends to create a
dynamic situation likely to produce criminal conduct. 52 To deal with these
dynamic situations university officials must be given "reasonable" authority
even if the authority to some extent infringes on "minor" interests
protected by the fourth amendment. 53 One can certainly differ with the
opening premise-that college "youth" are more prone to criminal
conduct. It may not even be accurate to classify college students as youth
since in many jurisdictions the age of 18 is now recognized as constituting
legal majority, and only seven percent of total college enrollment is below
the age of 18.54 Even if statistics do indicate a greater likelihood of crime
on campus, mere statistical probability has never been a legitimate basis
for conducting a search. 55 To recognize mere statistical probability would
allow the search of any home in a high crime area on nothing more
specific than crime report statistics for the year.
A further weakness of the "public interest" theory is the tendency to
generalize about situations rather than deal with specifics. The argument
is advanced that a college campus is such a volatile situation that the right
to privacy must be put aside; yet, University of Texas officials have
preserved discipline without ever authorizing a search, and the University
voluntarily relinquished any claim to the power to authorize a search.56
The balancing of public interests and private rights should not take place
in the general abstract where courts must deal with such concepts as a
youth's disposition to mischief. The balancing should be done through the
warrant procedure where a specific situation can be examined, and if
of the feasibility of procuring a warrant. See United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S.
56 (1950). The validity of Rabinowitz is highly doubtful in light of Coolidge v. New
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971), where the court held that warrantless searches were
"per se unreasonable" subject only to well recognized exceptions.
·
52 A college dormitory brings together a large group of energetic, adventurous and
often irresponsible young persons. Englehart v. Serena, 318 Mo. 263, 300 S.W. 268
(1927).
53
In other words, if the regulation--or, in the absence of a regulation, the action
of the college authorities-is necessary in aid of the basic respo11S1'bility of the
institution regarding discipline and the maintenance of an "educational atmosphere," then it will be presumed facially responsible despite the fact that it may
infringe to some extent on the outer bounds of the Fourth Amendment rights
of the students.
Moore, 284 F. Supp. at 729. This reasoning is similar to that in Frank v. Maryland,
359 U.S. 360, 367 (1959), where the court held that fire, health and housing inspections are socially necessary and are reasonable because they "touch at most upon the
periphery of the important interests safeguarded by •.. [the fourth amendment as
applied through the] Fourteenth Amendment's protection against official intrusion ... "
Frank was overruled in Camara v. Municipal Court, 387, U.S. 523 (1967).
M Van Alstyne, Student Academic Freedom and the Rule-Making Powers of Public
Universities: Some Constitutional Considerations, 2 LAW IN TRANS. Q. 1, 17-18 (1965).
See, People v. Cohen, 57 Misc.2d 366, 292 N.Y.S.2d 706 (1968), where the court
emphasized that university students are adults.
55 An invasion of privacy cannot "be justified on the grounds that there is a statistical
chance that a violation may be discovered." Commonwealth v. Swanger, 300 A.2d 66,
69 (1973). See T. SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WITHOUT TRIAL, 217-18 (1966).
56 Wright, supra note 9.
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necessary the determination made that in this particular situation the right
to privacy must yield to a greater public interest.57 As the Supreme Court
stated in Camara v. Municipal Court: "[A]n argument that the public
interest demands a particular rule must receive careful consideration. But
we think this argument misses the mark. The question is not, at this stage
at least, whether these inspections may be made, but whether they may be
made without a warrant." 58 Whether the right to privacy must yield to
public interest in a particular situation is a question to be confronted
each time a warrant is requested for the search of a specific area. This
question should not be preempted by a general rule eliminating the
need to examine a specific factual situation. It is simply not necessary
or reasonable to announce the general rule that, no matter whatever
other factors are present, one can never have a reasonable expectation
of privacy in a dormitory room. 59
THE WARRANT REQUIREMENT

If it is accepted that the fourth amendment does protect a student's
right to privacy in a dormitory room, the next area of concern is whether
the right can be set aside only pursuant to a valid search warrant. "It is
well settled under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments that a search
conducted without a warrant issued upon probable cause is per se
unreasonable ... 'subject only to a few specifically established and
well-delineated exceptions.' " 60 The recognized situations where a warrant
has generally not been required are: consent,61 incident to arrest,62 stop
and frisk,63 emergency,64 incident to arrest made inside a house, 65 and
plain view. 66 If a search by university officials falls within one of these
traditional exceptions to the warrant requirement the warrantless search
will be valid. The current concern is whether university officials are
covered by a distinct exception, i.e., will nothing other than the fact of
the search being authorized by university officials justify bypassing the
warrant procedure. All exceptions to the warrant requirement are based
57 Absent emergency or exceptional circumstances, warrantless administrative inspections are unreasonable under the fourth amendment. Colonnade Catering Corp. v.
United States, 397 U.S. 72 (1970).
158 387 U.S. 523, 533 (1967).
59 "The Fourteenth Amendment, as now applied to the States, protects the citizen
against the State itself and all of its creatures-Boards of Education not excepted.
These have, of course, important, delicate, and highly discretionary functions, but
none they may not perform within the limits of the Bill of Rights." West Virginia
State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943).
60Schneckloth v. Bustanionte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
61 fd. at 218; Bumper v. North Carolina, 381U.S.543 (1968).
62 Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
63 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
· 64 Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970).
65 Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30 (1970).
66Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
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on necessity, 67 thus it must be determined if there is anything unique about
a college dormitory necessitating the elimination of the requirement for a
warrant issued by a magistrate. No court has squarely confronted this
question although Moore v. Student Affairs Comm. of Troy State Univ. 68
held that a warrantless search was not violative of the fourth amendment
because it was "necessary in aid of the basic responsibility of the
institution regarding discipline and the maintenance of an 'educational
atmosphere.' " 69 While Moore determined that the act of searching was
necessary, it did not address itself to the issue of why it was necessary
to bypass the warrant procedure. Thus Moore evaded the thrust of
Camara v. Municipal Court 70 which recognized that individual rights may
have to yield to a valid interest, but this determination is to be made
by a magistrate not by the person conducting the search. The only time
that the magistrate may be bypassed is when "the burden of obtaining
a warrant is likely to frustrate the governmental purpose behind the
search.'' 71 Thus the question Moore did not address itself to is whether
obtaining a warrant would have frustrated the university's purpose of
maintaining discipline and an educational atmosphere.
Although the courts have not had an opportunity to rule on the
contention, it has been argued that the psychological effect of university
officials confronting students with search warrants would destroy the trust
and cooperativeness of an "educational atmosphere." 72 Although there
exists no empirical data on the psychological effect of a search warrant, it
seems highly doubtful that the modem student would prefer to entrust
protection of his rights to the benevolence of university officials rather than
have university officials observe constitutional procedures. Rather
than create an unpleasant educational atmosphere the "provision of
procedural protection should enhance a school's reputation for fairness
and thus prove a positive benefit." 73 A search warrant would indicate to a
student that the university official was not acting on whim or prejudice,
but pursuant to a lawful warrant issued by a neutral party-a judicial
officer. Whatever the cause, Ralph Naderism, the Civil Rights Movement,
etc., it seems clear that today's college student places more faith in the
judicial system than in any other public institution of our society.
Aside from the psychological effect of a search warrant, it has been
[T]he Constitution requires a magistrate to pass on the desires of the police
before they violate the privacy of the home. We cannot be true to that
constitutional requirement and excuse the absence of a search warrant without
a showing by those who seek exemption from the constitutional mandate that
the exigencies of the situation made that course imperative.
McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 456 (1948).
68 284 F. Supp. 725 (M.D. Ala. 1968).
69 Id. at 729.
10 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
11 Jd. at 533.
12 Comment, 17 KAN. L. REv. 512, 523 (1969).
13Academic Freedom, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1045, 1138 (1968).
67
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argued that the cost in terms of money and manpower of procuring a
warrant would be prohibitive, thus frustrating the university's educational
purpose. 74 It is pure speculation as to how much time and money would
be expended if the university were required to seek a warrant before
entering a dormitory room. Evidence of high cost might well be an
indication that the university is making excessive use of its claimed right
to enter dormitory rooms at will. As Camara stated there is no need to
seek a warrant when the individual allows the official to enter, and this
would be the normal situation.75 It is only the relatively unusual situation
when the individual chooses to stand on his right to privacy that a warrant
must be procured. Were this situation to occur frequently it may indicate
that university officials are abusing their claimed right of entry at any
time. The exercise of self-restraint and caution by university officials may
be the best way to avoid excessive cost, as well as providing its own
reward. Knowledge by university officials that they must rationally justify,
to a magistrate, their need to enter a particular room may discourage
impulsive entries based on the belief that there is an absolute right to
enter at any time. Encouraging university officials to act more cautiously
and rationally, might well promote the atmosphere of trust and cooperativeness which is one of the goals of the university. "Due process of law
is not for the sole benefit of an accused. It is the best insurance ... against
those blunders which leave lasting stains on a system of justice but which

One reason for fearing that the warrant procedure would be financially costly could
be the view that it would be necessary for universities to establish a separate warrant
procedure when searching for a non-criminal violation of university regulations. This
view maintains that when university officials are investigating non-criminal behavior
"a magistrate located 'downtown' would probably be powerless to issue warrants.
Consequently, the institution must develop within its own structures a surrogate
competent to review applications for search warrants." Note, 3 GA. L. REv. 426, 456
(1969). The cost in money and manpower of establishing such a separate warrant
procedure might indeed be prohibitive. But suffice it to say, that aside from the
wisdom and need for such a system it is questionable if the procedure would be
constitutional. If the right to privacy in a dormitory room is recognized, that privacy
cannot be breached absent a validly issued search warrant or established exceptions
to the warrant procedure. There is no authority for the proposition that the warrant
could be issued by anyone other than a magistrate. The fact that university officials
are investigating non-criminal behavior does not eliminate the need to procure a
warrant from a magistrate. In Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967), the
court faced a factual situation where health inspectors were investigating non-criminal
behavior. The court refused to uphold the health inspector's determination of the
necessity for the inspection, and the court affirmed the need for a search warrant
issued by a detached judicial party. When dealing with non-criminal activity, obviously
the definition of probable cause to enter must be redefined; but, there is no alteration
in the concept of who it is that must determine probable cause for entry.
75
[A]s a practical matter and in light of the Fourth Amendment's requirement that
a warrant specify the property to be searched, it seems likely that warrants
should normally be sought only after entry is refused unless there has been a
citizen complaint or there is other satisfactory reason for securing immediate
entry. Similarly, the requirement of a warrant procedure does not suggest any
change in what seems to be the prevailing local policy, in most situations, of
authorizing entry, but not entry by force, to inspect.
Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 539-40 (1967).
74
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are bound to occur on ex parte consideration. " 76
Aside from posing speculation on the financial costs and psychological
effects of search warrants, university officials have not carried the burden
of establishing that procuring a warrant would frustrate proper university
functions. If the campus situation is truly volatile requiring immediate
action then university officials are justified in bypassing the warrant
requirement under the traditional emergency exception. 77 If the situation
does not necessitate immediate action then there is no reason why
university officials should not seek a warrant. It is always inconvenient
to procure a search warrant, but inconvenience should not be the basis
for negating the warrant requirement.
STANDARD OF PROBABLE CAUSE

If it is accepted that the fourth amendment requires university

officials to procure a search warrant before entering a dormitory room,
the next concern is what grounds must be established before the search
warrant can be properly issued. The traditional test for issuing a
search warrant is the establishment of probable cause to believe that
seizable items, i.e., fruits, instrumentalities, or evidence of a crime, are
located in the area to be searched. 78 If the university officials are searching
for evidence of a crime (e.g., unlawful possession of drugs) there appears
no reason why the traditional standard of probable cause should not be
applicable. Whether the university officials actually contemplated a
criminal prosecution is irrelevant. Subjective intent is not the determining
factor; what is significant is an objective determination that the university
officials should have been aware that seizure of such items would subject
the student to possible prosecution.79
If the university officials are searching for an item that merely
violates a university regulation (e.g., possession of firearms) and has no
connection with a crime, then obviously the traditional definition of
probable cause is inapplicable. Rather than offer facts establishing a
reasonable ·belief that items connected with a crime are present, the
university officials would be required to establish a "valid public interest
[which] justifies the intrusion contemplated ... " 80 Presumably the valid
public interest would be the right and need to enforce university
regulations. Thus every suspected violation of university regulations would
create a valid public interest in seeing those regulations enforced. Clearly
the requirement to establish a reasonable belief of a violation of regulations
does not place an unreasonable burden on the university. In fact since all
76 Shaughnessey v. United States, 345 U.S. 206, 224-5 (1953) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
77Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30 (1970).
78 B. SCHWARTZ, CoNSTITVTIONAL LAW 237 (1972).
79 See text accompanying notes 49 and 50 supra.
80 Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 539 (1967).
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regulations are presumed to be reasonable, 81 it has been argued that
creating such a low standard of probable cause makes ·the search warrant
automatic and the result is the same as if the warrant were eliminated
entirely. 82 The Supreme Court in Camara rejected the argument that
lessening the standard of probable cause would lead to "rubber stamp"
warrants. Even a lesser standard of probable cause to be passed on by a
magistrate is preferable to leaving the decision to search to the discretion
of the official conducting the search. The adequacy of probable cause
must be determined "by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of
being judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise
of ferreting out crime." 83 As the Supreme Court emphasized in Coolidge
v. New Hampshire 84 and Spinelli v. United States,85 the requirement that
a warrant be issued by a magistrate serves a valid purpose and is not a
meaningless procedure. "It is not without significance that most of the
provisions of the Bill of Rights are procedural. It is procedure that spells
much of the difference between rule by law and rule by whim or caprice." 88
APPLICATION OF THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE

The wisdom and effectiveness of the exclusionary rule continue to
engender heated debate, 87 but the principle is quite clear: When government officials violate the criminal defendant's fourth amendment right to
privacy, they may not offer in evidence the fruits of such an illegal
search.88 The fact that the criminal defendant is a student and the
government officials are university officials should not in any way alter
the applicability of the exclusionary rule to criminal prosecutions.89
University officials cannot engage in illegal action and then present the
fruits of such action to the prosecutor on a silver platter. Although
the exclusionary rule should be applied to a criminal prosecution of a
student, it is a more difficult question whether the rule is applicable to
a university disciplinary proceeding. Whether the rule applies depends
upon a determination of the nature of a university disciplinary proceeding.
The application of the exclusionary rule is limited to proceedings
·which are of a criminal or quasi-criminal nature. 90 Cases are greatly
Moore, 284 F. Supp. at 729.
See v. Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 554-5 (1967) (Clark, J., dissenting).
83Aquilarv. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 111 (1964).
84 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
85 393 U.S. 410 (1969).
86Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 179 (1951) (Douglas,
J., concurring).
87 For a bibliography see Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 267, n.24 (Powell, J., concurring).
88 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Weeks v. U.S., 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
89 Piazzola v. Watkins, 442 F.2d 284 (5th Cir.. 1971); People v. Cohen, 57 Misc. 2d
366, 292 N.Y.S.2d 706 (Dist. Ct. 1968); Commonwealth v. McClosky, 217 Pa. Super.
432, 272 A.2d 271 (1970).
90Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217 (1960); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616
(1886).
81
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divided as to what constitutes a quasi-criminal proceeding;91 but, thus far
the courts have uniformly rejected ilie proposition that university disciplinary proceedings are criminal in nature and effect.92 The plaintiffs in
Esteban v. Central Mo. State College 93 contended that public institution
disciplinary proceedings were analogous to criminal and juvenile proceedings; thus, the procedural due process guarantees applicable in criminal and
juvenile cases should be afforded to students facing possible expulsion
and lesser disciplinary penalties. The court rejected this argument, stating
that "[t]he nature and procedure of the disciplinary process ... should not
be required to conform to federal processes of criminal law, which are ...
designed for circumstances and ends unrelated to the academic community." 94 Thus even if students succeed in having the courts recognize
their fourth amendment right to be free of unreasonable searches of
a dormitory room, the most effective protection of that right-the
exclusionary rule--may be denied to students if the university is willing
to forego criminal prosecution and take disciplinary action.
Since the courts refuse to analogize university disciplinary proceedings
to criminal prosecutions, there is no binding precedent for applying the
rule to disciplinary proceedings. If the exclusionary rule is to apply in
university disciplinary proceedings the rule will probably have to evolve
through the same process which led the courts to apply it in criminal
cases. This means that students will have to appeal to ethical considerations, 95 and/or prove that there is no other effective method of preserving
fourth amendment rights. The appeal to ethical considerations seems
particularly strong when considering the conduct of educators.
[Educators] have, of course, important, delicate, and highly discretionary functions, but none that they may not perform within the
limits of the Bill of Rights. That they are educating the young for
citizenship is reason for scrupulous protection of Constitutional
91See generally Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217 (1960); Powell v. Zuckert, 366
F.2d 634 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Lassoff v. Gray, 207 F. Supp. 843 (W.D. Ky. 1962); In re
Martinez, 83 Cal. Rptr. 382, 463 P.2d 734 (1970); Carson v. State, 221 Ga. 299, 144
S.E.2d 384 (1965); Sackler v. Sackler, 15 N.Y.2d 40, 203 N.E.2d 481 (1964).
92 Dixon v. Bd. of Ed., 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1961); Esteban v. Central Mo. State
College, 290 F. Supp. 622 (W.D. Mo. 1968); Goldberg v. Regents of Univ. of
California, 284 Cal. App. 2d 867, 57 Cal. Rptr. 463 (Cal. App. 1967); Cornette
v. Aldridge, 408 S.W.2d (Texas Ct. Civ. App. 1966).
93 290 F. Supp. 622 {W.D. Mo. 1968).
94 Id. at 629.
95 The ethical consideration is whether, apart from the Constitution, a court should
accept evidence obtained by a criminal act. See generally Burdeau v. McDowell, 256
U.S. 465, 476 (1921) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); Williams v. Williams, 8 Ohio Misc.
156, 221 N.E.2d (1966); Del Presto v. Del Presto, 92 N.J. Super. 305, 223 A.2d 217
(1966). The appeal to ethical considerations may indeed be persuasive to university
officials. A survey of American colleges and universities revealed that "50 percent of
the schools replying indicated that their hearing boards could not consider evidence
obtained in violation of law or university regulations. Only 16 percent indicated that
they would use such evidence, the remainder failing to respond." Project, 1970 DUKE
L.J. 763, 770 (1970).
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freedoms of the individual, if we are not to strangle the free mind
at its source and teach youth to discount important principles of
our government as mere platitudes.96
But, the courts should be careful to note that merely because one
recognizes the importance of educators setting an example, and one accepts
this as a proper goal, it does not necessarily follow that this goa:l can
only be achieved by adopting the exclusionary rule.
Ethical considerations aside, the continued existence of the exclusionary rule in its present form is under attack and the climate does not seem
right for uncritical extension of the rule. Perhaps, the Chief Justice Burger
has suggested, it is time to reexamine the effectiveness of the exclusionary
rule and consider new alternatives. 97 University disciplinary proceedings
could provide a viable area for testing the effectiveness of proposed
alternatives to the exclusionary rule.
SUMMARY

Unless the judiciary abandons its willingness to examine academic
due process, it appears that university officials will be forced to recognize
a student's right to privacy in a dormitory room. The concept of a
reasonable expectation of privacy announced in Katz should clearly afford
dormitory residents protection against arbitrary entry by university
officials. To prove that a warrantless entry of a dormitory room is
reasonable and not arbitrary, university officials have offered nothing
except speculation as to the financial costs and supposed psychological
effects of the warrant procedure. The burden of establishing the necessity
for bypassing the warrant procedure rests upon university officials, and
they cannot satisfy the burden by offering such unsubstantiated fears. The
standard of probable cause for issuing a search warrant is well established
in law, regardless of whether university officials are searching for evidence
of a crime or merely for violation of university regulations. The only area
for legitimate debate is the question of applying the exclusionary rule to
university disciplinary proceedings. A debate and experimentation in this
area could be a tremendous aid to the entire criminal law field. For it is
in this area of university disciplinary proceedings that ·the courts are free
of precedent binding them to the exclusionary rule. This area provides a
microcosm in which to test and rethink the proposals that existed before
Mapp v. Ohio 98 and that were again put forward in Chief Justice Burger's
dissent in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents.99 A reexamination of
the merits of the exclusionary rule would not only achieve justice
within the area of university disciplinary proceedings, it would provide
valuable empirical data which could be used if the Supreme Court
reconsiders the exclusionary rule's application to criminal prosecutions.
Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943).
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 411-24 (1971) (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting).
es 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
99 403 U.S. 388, 411-24 (1971).
96
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